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ABSTRACT
The main research aim is to investigate what information is necessary to make a formal
vulnerability pattern representation. This is done through the usage of formal Backus-Naur-
Form syntax for the execution and presented with newly created vulnerability flow diagram.
Some future works were also proposed to further enhance the elements in the secured soft-
ware process framework. This thesis focuses on the research and development of the design,
formalization and translation of the vulnerability classification pattern through a framework
using common vulnerabilities and exposures data. To achieve this aim, the following work
was carried out. First step is to create and conceptualized necessary meta-process. Second
step is to specify the relationship between the classifiers and vulnerability classification pat-
terns. This inclusive of the investigation of vulnerability classification objectives, processes,
classifiers and focus domains among prominent framework. Final step is to construct the
framework by establishing the formal presentation of the vulnerability classification algo-
rithm. The validation process was conducted empirically using statistical method to assess
the accuracy and consistency by using the precision and recall rate of the algorithm on five
data sets each with 500 samples. The findings show a significant result with precision's error
rate or p value is between 0.01 and 0.02 with error rate for recall's error rate is between 0.02
and 0.04. Another validation was conducted to verify the correctness of the classification
by using expert opinions, and the results showed that the ambiguity of several cases were
subdue. Formal-based classification framework with notation may increase accuracy and vi-
sualization compared with hierarchy-tree only, but the conclusion remains tentative because
of methodological limitation in the studies.
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ABSTRAK
Tujuan utama penyelidikan ini adalah untuk menyiasat perincian yang diperlukan untuk
membuat perwakilan formal corak kerentanan. Ini dilakukan melalui penggunaan sintaks
Backus-Naur-Form untuk pelaksanaan dan diwasilahkan dengan pengenalan kepada rajah
aliran rentan yang baru. Beberapa titipan kerja untuk masa depan juga dicadangkan untuk
menambahbaik elemen-elemen dalam rangka kerja perisian jamin-selamat. Tesis ini membe-
ri tumpuan kepada penyelidikan dan pembangunan reka bentuk, formalisasi dan terjemah-
an corak klasifikasi kerentanan melalui rangka kerja menggunakan data kerentanan umum
dan kededahan lazim. Untuk mencapai matlamat ini, kerja-kerja berikut telah dijalankan.
Langkah pertama adalah mewujudkan dan memberi konsep kepada meta-proses. Langkah
kedua ialah menentukan hubungan antara pengelas dan corak pengelas kerentanan. Ini ter-
masuklah kenalpasti objektif klasifikasi kerentanan, proses, klasifikasi dan fokus domain di
antara rangka kerja-rangka kerja yang ada. Langkah terakhir ialah membina rangka kerja
dengan menghasilkan paparan algoritma klasifikasi kerentanan formal. Proses pengesah-
an dijalankan secara empirikal menggunakan kaedah statistik untuk menilai ketepatan dan
ketekalan algoritma berdasarkan pada kadar ketepatan dan panggil-balik ke atas lima set
data, setiap satunya dengan 500 sampel. Hasil penemuan menunjukkan dapatan yang sig-
nifikan dengan kadar ralat ketepatan atau nilai p adalah antara 0.01 dan 0.02 dan kadar
ralat untuk kadar ralat panggil-balik adalah antara 0.02 dan 0.04. Satu lagi pengesahan te-
lah dijalankan untuk menentusahkan jenis klasifikasi dengan menggunakan pendapat pakar,
dan hasilnya menunjukkan bahawa ketidaktentuan beberapa kes telah dikurangkan. Juste-
ru, rangka klasifikasi berasaskan formal dengan notasi boleh meningkatkan ketepatan dan
visualisasi berbanding dengan secara hiraki sahaja, tetapi kesimpulannya adalah tentatif
kerana batasan metodologi dalam kajian.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In software application, it is observed that there are negative consequences when
security is compromised. Security can be compromised when there is lack of understanding
of the in hand situation. Various terms used for security and it's family, huge numbers of
models and framework to refer to, had created confusions to the software practitioner to
classify vulnerability that is accurate, consistence and correct.
It is observed that there is a challenge in forming a vulnerability classification scheme
due to type of data used. For example, some vulnerability database like Common Vulnera-
bilities Exposures or CVE is very much using natural language structure but without proper
English grammar as given in its´ web page of (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:The
Standard for Information Security Vulnerability Names, 2015). One way to extract the infor-
mation is by using semantic analysis (Rebolloa et al., 2015). However, in security domain,
some terms are used differently. For instance, the meaning of buffer overflow is to overwrite
the adjacent memory by overrun buffer and is not simply means that buffer is more than full.
Therefore, it is learned that the terms must be specified with related to predefined rules of
information security. Another challenge was to formally translate the domain terms into a
schema that can be translated to a workable engine to extract the vulnerability given a histor-
ical database as debated in (Shaikh and Sasikumar, 2015). Therefore, this study is to focus
on this scenario.
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1.2 Problem Statement
The current vulnerability classification suffered from multiple dimensions of classi-
fiers. They are either too specific or too complex (Ruohonen et al., 2017; Tripathi and Singh,
2011). Or they were only for dedicated cases. This lead to disability to perform a detection
or protection from next attack of vulnerability. The understanding of the taxonomy which
also various, requires a formal classification that can be used for generic cases regardless of
applications, mobiles, networks or other devices (Burger et al., 2014).
The above research statement is divided into three research problem (RP) and the
summary of the above statements are illustrated in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Summary of research problems
RP Research Problems (RP)
RP1 The current vulnerability classification use multiple dimen-
sions of classifiers are the issues needed to be addressed
(Carl et al., 1994; Aslam et al., 1996b; Tripathi and Singh,
2011; Du and Mathur, 1998)
RP2 Lack of generic and systematic process to describe the vul-
nerability classification process , which disable to be per-
formed on other classes. (Jiwnani and Zelkowitz, 2002; Kat-
rina et al., 2005; S et al., 2005; Eagle et al., 2006; Bazaz and
Arthur, 2007)
RP3 There is an absent of formal application to translate the vul-
nerability classification into solutions. (Eagle et al., 2006;
Bazaz and Arthur, 2007; Lowis and Accorsi, 2011; Leitner
and Rinderle-Ma, 2014). Therefore, the vulnerability classi-
fication requires a comprehensive and viable process
2
Table 1.1 showed that the research aim is simplified into three manageable research
problems. Each research problem is then matched with specific research questions as dis-
cussed in the following section.
1.3 Research Questions
Four research questions (RQ) are constructed from the research problems (RP):
(a) What are the existing secured software framework?
This research question examines the existing frameworks from the earliest known
to the current.
(b) What is the difference in the their objectives, processes, classifiers and focus
domains?
This research question examines the existing frameworks by their objectives,
processes, classifiers used and focus domain.
(c) What is the relationship between the classifiers and vulnerability classifica-
tion patterns?
This research question is constructed to examine the relationship between clas-
sifiers and classification of known vulnerabilities to describe a pattern.
(d) How can we formally present the vulnerability classification algorithm ?
This research question is to find out the answer of how the classifiers can be
applied on incident cases or vulnerability database, formally.
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(e) How can we measure the accuracy, consistency and correctness of the vul-
nerability classification algorithm ?
This research question focused on the assessment method. In order to assessed
the accuracy, consistency and correctness, a procedure of validation shall be
defined.
This research question is summarized as illustrated in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Summary of research questions
RP RQ Research Questions (RQ)
RP1 RQ1 What are the existing secured software
framework?
RP2 RQ2 What is the difference in the their objectives,
processes, classifiers and focus domains?
RP1,RP2 RQ3 What is the relationship between the classi-
fiers and vulnerability classification patterns?
RP2,RP3 RQ4 How can we formally present the vulnerabil-
ity classification algorithm ?
RP1,RP2,RP3 RQ5 How can we measure the accuracy, consis-
tency and correctness of the vulnerability
classification algorithm ?
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives
The research problems and questions addressed in Section 1.2 and Section 1.3 then
are used to formulate the research aim and objectives. This thesis focus on the research and
development of the design, formalization and translation of the vulnerability classification
pattern through a framework using common vulnerabilities and exposures data. It is achieve
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through the usage of syntax and semantic formal representation that not only accurate to
produce a simplified set of vulnerabilities patterns but also consistently can be use within
other incident cases.
Consequently, three research objectives (RO) have been formulated to achieve the
research aim. These ROs are summarized and mapped to respective Research Problem(RP)
and Research Questions(RQ) as in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Summary of research objectives
RP RQ RO Research Objectives(RO)
RP1 RQ1 RO1 To determine a generic procedures
needed for secured software process
framework.
RP1,RP2 RQ3 RO2 To determine the relationship be-
tween the classifiers and vulnerability
classification patterns.
RP2,RP3 RQ3 RO3 To construct the framework by estab-
lishing the formal presentation of the
vulnerability classification algorithm.
Table 1.3 shows that RO1 is to determine the generic procedures needed for secured
software process framework by analyzing current situation. The output, is expected to be
in form of models and processes involved. Next, in RO2 is to determine the relationship
between the classifiers and vulnerability classification patterns. The expected outcome from
RO3 is to construct the framework by establishing the formal vulnerability classification pat-
tern algorithm. This is done through the form of four tuple schema to represent the incidents
structure.
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1.5 Research Scope
This scope of this research is focuses on several issues as listed below:
(a) This study is conducted on historical incidents reports that authorized by non-
profit company
(b) This research focus classification of security vulnerability
1.6 Significance of the Study
The findings of this study will touch on to the benefit of security practitioner con-
sidering the diversify of vulnerability incident cases occurred hourly. There is a need for a
correct, accurate and consistent vulnerability classification algorithm that can be used not
only for specific system. Thus, this formal representation of the scheme that produced by
this framework is essential. The list of contributions are as followed:
• Investigation of generic process of vulnerability classification
This research investigate the existing process in determining the vulnerability classifi-
cation.
• Elaborate the classification meta-process
Another contribution in this dissertation is a detail elaboration of a meta-process for a
vulnerability classification.
• Establish the formal representation for the incident structure
This study established the four tuple schema to represent the incident structure.
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• Developed the algorithm for vulnerability classification
The research developed an algorithm for vulnerability classification using syntax and
semantic analysis and context-free grammar that suit with the problem and data do-
main.
1.7 Organization of the Study
This thesis consist seven chapters. Chapter 1, describe the overview of the study. It
covers the research problems, objective, scope and contributions of the research. Chapter
2 described the literature review inclusive the debate of findings. Chapter 3 presents the
methodology used to accomplish this study, Chapter 4 depicts the design which concern
with the generic process and four tuples, Chapter 5 detailed out representation of the tuples
using context free grammar. Chapter 6 discuss the results and validation works. Last but not
least, Chapter 7 conclude the contributions of and future research directions.
1.8 Summary
This chapter provides the introduction to the research by describing the research back-
ground, research problems, research questions, aims and scope. The next chapter will de-
scribe the related work done through a comprehensive literature review.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a review on the literature of theoretical background is presented. We
analyze the current practice and approaches used in secured software process. This chapter
begins a covering of vulnerability classification method review. And followed by discussion
of secured software process. The output of this chapter is to answer the first research question
RQ1: “What are the existing secured software framework?”
This research will integrate security life cycle process with software framework. A
systematic approach is proposed to support the software framework focusing on security
concerns. The techniques, such as text parsing, formal context free grammar model, notation
model and threat model are used to apply security domain in the classification models to
improve the accuracy and acceptability of the proposed general framework.
Towards the end, as a synthesis of the chapter, the theoretical background of this study
is formulated. Finally, the last subsection summarize and conclude the chapter by pointing
out the gaps in the current literature. These gaps are to be addressed in the rest of the thesis.
2.2 An Overview
Approximately, 77 percent of legitimate websites had exploitable vulnerabilities and
1-in-8 of all websites had a critical vulnerability as reported by (Symantec, 2014). These
tremendous number forced the interest to investigate of how the vulnerabilities is classified
and how it can be beneficially used.
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Studies on vulnerability classification are not new, yet the issues remain unsolved. A
research by US-Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) shows an increasing num-
bers of incidents in fiscal year 2006-2015 with over 70,000 vulnerabilities was cataloged in
the 2015. The incidents are given in the Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Cyber and Non-cyber Incidents reported by Federal Agencies in fiscal year 2006-2015
(Source: GAO analysis of US-CERT)
Figure 2.1 shows the cataloged vulnerabilities from 2006 to 2015. The pattern shows
an increasing trend. For instance, a stranger can enter another people accounts due to in-
correct or incomplete user validation. Or, an unauthorized user can reach a confidential file
intentionally, due to unaudited access (Ponemon, 2014). In business domain, the effort to
prevent loss because of the applications security has been reported increasing, due to the so-
phisticated of attacks and new technologies (Loveland and Lobel, 2012). In addition, some
defects were late detected until serious aftermath as in Stuxnet virus incident which cause
the Zero-day phenomena (Kim, 2014). Apart from being a catastrophic factor in application,
poor security also imposes monetary loss. As in August 2015, a report by Internet Crime
Complaint Center or IC3 of USA, showed a loss of over USD 1.2 billion due to email scam
in 50 states and 79 countries (Brian, 2015).
9
In the beginning, two primary studies as in (Abbott et al., 1976) and (Bisbey and
Hollingworth, 1978) had shown that an emerging of vulnerability studies occurred since
early 70s. These studies, the RISOS project and Protection Analysis project were guided
by (Weissman, 1973) and (Linde, 1975) classification procedure which were inspired from
penetration test. Consequently, a great deal of research had focused on the vulnerability
classification style, approaches and perspectives as debated in reported thesis and articles by
(Carl et al., 1994; Aslam et al., 1996a; Jiwnani and Zelkowitz, 2002; Lowis and Accorsi,
2011; Luo et al., 2014). However, these existing research had focus differently in their own
scope of works, which in return showed gaps.
2.2.1 The Gap
The early work on vulnerability classification focus on the knowledge of fault iden-
tification. It tried to solve the difficulty of identifying the origin of faults within a software
(Abbott et al., 1976; Bisbey and Hollingworth, 1978). The initial works claimed there is a
specific place a fault exist or known as origin. However, the newer research claimed that
the place alone can not be considered as the origin of fault but shall encompasses the time
it occurred, as debated in (Carl et al., 1994; Aslam et al., 1996a). The later work eventu-
ally pointed out that the development phases are used as the time the origin introduced, as
summary in Figure 2.2.
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 Place-based fault 
identification 
(Abbott et al., 1976), 
(Bisbey and 
Hollingworth, 1978) 
Time-based fault 
identification 
(Carl et al., 1994) 
SDLC-based fault 
identification  
(Aslam et al.,1996a) 
Perspective-based fault 
identification 
(Landwerh, 1994), 
(Aslam et, al., 1996a) 
(Du and Marthur, 
1998), (Jiwnani, 2002) 
(Avizienis et al., 2004) 
Figure 2.2: The research on origin of errors introduced
However, there is a gap to wonder of how does these information can help the devel-
oper to prevent them re-do the same mistakes.
The knowledge of this fault identification leads to the terminology emergent of faults,
failures, errors and attacks. Shortly, a differentiation of the definition is given in (Carl et al.,
1994) as following. An error is a human action that produces an incorrect result, a fault is an
incorrect step, process or data definition in a computer program and a failure is the inability
of a system to perform its required functions within specified performance requirements. As
system becomes complex, (Munson et al., 2006) defined fault as an imperfection that able
to result as failure in software, as summarized in Figure 2.3. However, their study focus on
the taxonomy of security terms and did not critically informing enough how the terms can
be used to reduce numbers of vulnerabilities.
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 Errors 
Human actions that 
produce incorrect result 
(Carl et al., 1994) 
Faults 
Incorrect steps, 
process or data 
definition or 
imperfection  in 
program 
(Carl et al., 1994), 
(Munson et al., 
2006) 
Failures 
Inability of system 
to perform its 
required functions 
(Walia and Carver, 
2009), (Luo et al., 
2014) 
Figure 2.3: Error, Fault and Failures
Eventually, another finding is the study of relationship between the terms which per-
haps gave new meanings to reduce vulnerability. Few researchers addressed fault as a con-
crete manifestation of an error within the software. One error may cause several faults, and
various errors may cause identical faults which if encountered can cause system failure as
deduced by (Walia and Carver, 2009; Luo et al., 2014). However, (Aslam et al., 1996b)
uniquely elaborates the relationship between vulnerability and error. They defined that vul-
nerability is an instance of an error, and error can be in specification or development or
software configuration. We also learned that (Bishop, 1999) in their work introduced the
vulnerability term as a characterization of vulnerable states which is distinguish from any
non-vulnerable states as in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Relationship of the terms-Error, Fault, Failures and Vulnerabilities
Perhaps, because of this consensus, later, in (Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sures:The Standard for Information Security Vulnerability Names, 2015), another definition
of vulnerability is given as a state in a computing system that either:
(a) Allows an attacker to execute commands as another user
(b) Allows an attacker to access data that is contrary to the specified access restric-
tions for that data
(c) Allows an attacker to pose another entity
(d) Allows an attacker to conduct a denial of service
These definition can be summarized as in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Another Definition of Vulnerability by CVE, 2015
Figure 2.5 indicate the involvement of attacker role when comes to vulnerability that
can caused say, various of failures, which in this case referred as F1-F4. This definition
shows, when connecting with definition from Figure 2.4, that vulnerabilities are the negative
consequences of faults that bring about from one or more errors. And they are always related
to external user or attacker who manipulates the vulnerabilities to get access. As a result,
a compromised vulnerabilities can cause a (or various) system failures as showed in Figure
2.6. This figure shows a Venn diagram when, say, four various failures namely as F1-F4
occurred, they are actually caused by vulnerabilities which represent by the shaded bullets.
Example, a bullet could caused F1 or F2 or both.
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Figure 2.6: Vulnerabilities - negative consequences of faults - from one or more errors
Consequently, the term vulnerability in vulnerability classification reflect an inclusive
meaning in related to the reason of any software failures. But, still is the issue of how to
classified these vulnerabilities given the fact that vulnerability, so that a developer could
know which failure they are related to.
Therefore, this literature review draw attention to some gaps in vulnerability clas-
sification. Very often, the common style of classification promote the vulnerabilities to be
placed in more than one class, due to the hierarchical style of classification. This technique
is called data multiplication. Multiplication of data is the major drawback. For example, if
vulnerability x is located into class α and class β , it will return a confusion for later analysis
especially for treatment. This will cause an incorrect result. The method were later improved
by (Weissman, 1995) as discussed in (Lough, 2001), but still not much difference. On top of
that, (Bishop, 1999) argued the classification of flaws in PA project, RISOS project and in
(Aslam et al., 1996b) which they meet neither the uniqueness nor the well defined decision
procedure requirement. They suggest that one can view a vulnerability as a containing class
and attacks as elements of that class.
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In 2005, two researchers from CMU/SEI published their work of new way of classi-
fication through technical report in (Seacord and Householder, 2005). In order to avoid mul-
tiplication issues in mentioned earlier, which using hierarchical style of classification, they
suggested the attribute-pair values through object-roles definition of vulnerability. However,
the method suffered the level of abstraction and viewpoint. Another researcher, (Eagle et al.,
2006) classified the vulnerabilities through characteristic trees, still is a hierarchical style
of classification which suffer the trade off between different operating system used. In the
nutshell, the gap is the vulnerability classification is still an issue where, it could be either
too specific to certain system or too complex which, in addition, introduce the ambiguity.
2.2.2 Vulnerability Classification
Given the pivotal role that the way classification made contributes to the outcome, it
is important to establish a vulnerability classification method that put through for their goals
and classification perspective. It is crucial to argue whether the multiplication shall exist in
the classification and whether the classification style (hierarchical and attribute-pair values)
matters in secured software process.
A summary of classification was done in Table 2.1. The table showed that the goals
of vulnerabilities classification in early works as in (Abbott et al., 1976) to collect error ex-
amples, with the intention to search vulnerability, which later encourage the development
of metrics as in (Bisbey and Hollingworth, 1978) that classified using pattern directed eval-
uation method. Next, (Carl et al., 1994) worked on the goal on security enforcement for
operating system and explore the classification based on genesis - time of introduction and
location.
The work on flaw database started by (Aslam et al., 1996b) he introduced an organi-
zational method for it. The idea was to promote on static analysis which also used in (Alenezi
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and Alenezi, 2016), as well as to produce a detection tool using that database as reference.
The classification used four perspectives -synchronization errors, condition validation er-
rors, and emergent faults. Later, in 1998, a work on classification by (Du and Mathur, 1998),
was to promote the effectiveness of code coverage using cause, impact and type of change
perspective. A classification work by (Bishop, 1999) was to develop analyzing tools using
mathematical presentation. In 2001, (Lough, 2001) did the classification using improper
conditions and started using the terms of secured protocols and system.
An extended work on (Carl et al., 1994) research was done by (Jiwnani and Zelkowitz,
2002) to develop testing strategies based on the vulnerabilities classification. A work on sys-
tematic framework for measurement purpose was found in (Chillarege et al., 1992) using
orthogonal defect classification. In addition, the classification also matters in a way to iden-
tify attributes as in (Avizienis et al., 2004) by using classification of duration, extent,value
and cause of fault. In (Katrina et al., 2005), the work on static analysis gain more popularity
to enable automatic identification of fault. Another goal by (S et al., 2005) doing classifi-
cation to provide tools for developer. The automatic tools phenomenon was also found in
(Seacord and Householder, 2005) by using engineering analysis.
A new perspective on classification was carried by (Eagle et al., 2006) to enable a
language to express vulnerabilities. In 2007, (Bazaz and Arthur, 2007) expressed the vul-
nerabilities as constraints and assumption by integrating their hardware, memory and other
media. A classication model by (Cui et al., 2008) work on historical dataset effectiveness
inspection. Historical dataset also used to build common dictionary by usig ontology-driven
as in (Vlas and Robinson, 2011). A classification using tree to enable transferability between
architecture was supported by (Lowis and Accorsi, 2011). An more work on ontology and
text mining were done in (Leitner and Rinderle-Ma, 2014) to enhance the security awareness.
Table 2.1 and 2.2 summarizes the perspectives of various researchers addressed above.
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Table 2.1: Vulnerabilities classification based on respective research goal
Researchers Goals Classification Perspective 
Abbott,1976 To automate the search of flaws Collect error examples, abstract 
patterns 
Bisbey,1978 To develop metrics for software 
security features 
Pattern-directed protection 
evaluation 
Landwerh,1994 To develop security policy enforcement 
for operating system  
Genesis, time of introduction and 
location 
Aslam,1996  Organizational method for 
flaws databases 
 Assist in static analysis  
 To produce flaw detection tools 
Coding faults (synchronization 
errors, condition validation errors) 
and emergent faults (configuration 
errors, environment faults) 
Du and Marthur, 
1998 
To measure the effectiveness of code 
coverage  
Classifies errors by their cause, 
impact and type of change 
Bishop,1999 To develop an analyzing tools  Using primitive conditions, 
formal top-level 
specification (mathematical 
representation of computer 
vulnerabilities) 
 Classification using level of 
abstraction and viewpoint 
Lough, 2001 To get secure protocols and system Classification using improper 
condition of (validation, exposure, 
randomness, deallocation, 
improper, conditions and 
taxonomy) 
Jiwnani,2002 To develop testing strategy based on 
classification of vulnerabilities 
Classification scheme is based on 
Landwerh,1994 
Chillarege et 
al.,2003 
To develop systematic framework for 
building measurement and analysis 
method 
Orthogonal defect classification 
Avizienis et al., 
2004 
To finding fault-tolerance attributes Duration, extent, value and cause of 
fault 
Tsipenyuk, 2005 To develop automatic identification 
using static source code analysis 
technique 
Classification using biology term of 
phyla and kingdoms 
Weber et al.,2005 To provide tools for developer Correlate the previous taxonomy 
about high-priority security threats 
(by identifying common factors 
among sets of analysis) 
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Table 2.2: Vulnerabilities Classification based on Respective Research Goal (..continued)
Researchers Goals Classification Perspective 
Seacord and 
Householder, 
2005 
To automate analyzing code for 
vulnerabilities  
Attribute value pairs using engineering 
analysis (to resolve multiplication of 
categories). Objects has attribute, which 
with a defined value is called property (i.e 
exploits and mitigation technique)  
Eagle et 
al.,2006 
To create language for expressing 
vulnerabilities 
Classification using characteristic tree: 
 Define characteristic 
 Create characteristic tree 
 Classify vulnerabilities 
Bazaz & 
Arthur,2007 
To express vulnerability in term of 
constraints and assumptions 
 Process/Object model of 
computation  
 Relationship between software 
vulnerabilities, an executing process 
and computer system resources 
(memory, i/o, cryptographic media) 
Seaman C. et 
al.,2008 
To create models for effectiveness 
inspection  
Using historical dataset to categorize 
defects 
Artem V. and 
Nagiza B., 
2010 
To develop common dictionary for 
humans and software agents 
Classification using ontology-driven 
Lowis, 2011 To improve transferability among 
architecture 
Classification using enhanced tree with 
attributes of : 
 Point of view 
 Attack effect 
 Active component 
 Involved standard 
 Triggering property 
Leitner M. and 
Rinderle-Ma 
S., 2014 
To enhance the process awareness 
of security control 
Classification using text mining 
 
Table 2.1 and 2.2 shows the goals and perspectives involved in doing a classification.
The goals demonstrates of how the classification is being seen and carried out. The summary
shows that a trend of classification from as basic as error example to data mining had been
carried out. However, the diversity of classification patterns still can be refine as some of
them had produced a complex patterns with huge number of classes.
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2.2.3 Vulnerability Classification: The Generic Process
The analysis during these study also reveal that each classification scheme by the
researchers consist of few generic processes namely as identification, analysis, confirmation
and elimination of flaw. The summary of the processes completed by the researchers are as
in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Vulnerabilities classification based on processes
Researchers 
Processes 
Identification Analysis Confirmation  Elimination  
McPhee      
Attanasio       
RISOS      
Project Analysis      
Landwehr et al.     
Aslam      
Krusal      
Du and Mathur     
Bishop      
Jiwnani     
Piessens     
Andy Gray     
Tsipenyuk     
Weber     
Seacord and 
Householder  
    
Bazaz and Arthur      
Tripathi & Kumar       
 
Table 2.3 shows four generic processes in determining and classifying vulnerabilities:
identification, analysis, confirmation and elimination of flaw. The identification process cov-
ers from non-unique identification of system resource to specific identification. The analysis
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process involves the labeling, add-on features and dissemination of identified flaws. The con-
firmation process is putting the flaw into the appropriate class. And the elimination process
informs the reader that the respective perspective also able to assist in reducing the identified
flaws. The reasons of having these four generic processes, according to (NIST Interagency
Report, 2015), (Tripathi and Singh, 2011) (Biggio et al., 2014), (Burger et al., 2014) are to:
establish, act upon and maintain relationship about the threat in related with their life cycle.
The development team can gain better awareness of the larger threat viewpoint when this in-
formation is shared in advance of an incident, hence reducing the occurrence of next possible
bugs and vulnerabilities.
From the analysis, not all works consist every processes. But, here, from the ta-
ble showed that at least three initial processes must exist in any vulnerability classification
scheme - identification, analysis and confirmation. Using this generic processes, many re-
searchers develop their own models or frameworks to reduce the numbers of bugs and vul-
nerabilities as in (Tripathi and Singh, 2011) and (Lowis and Accorsi, 2011). However, the
definition of what kind of classifiers or framework that should work with vulnerability clas-
sification is remained a dispute. Next sections further discuss the classifiers, patterns and
framework definitions use in this study.
2.2.4 Vulnerability Classification: The Classifiers
Various work on classification criteria have been proposed, such as in (Tripathi and
Singh, 2011), (Jiwnani and Zelkowitz, 2002), (Katrina et al., 2005), (Firesmith, 2005) and
(Carl et al., 1994). However, those classification are more towards addressing the features
selection based on the researchers objectives. According to the researchers, although they
defined the purposes and the perspectives, they had not explain how the classifiers can be
adopted into a real data. It will be useful if the classification process is guided with some
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real life vulnerability incidents in order to ensure that the classification can be achieved in ac-
curate and correct manners. This study defines the classifiers for vulnerability classification
as the features to select the attributes and put into it class. The procedures of determining
the classifiers are discuss in Chapter 4. The classifiers will determine which class a vulner-
ability belongs too. The results create a series of patterns, which in this study referred as
vulnerabilities patterns.
2.2.5 Vulnerability Classification: The Vulnerabilities Patterns
The vulnerabilities patterns are the categories that differentiate type of vulnerabilities.
The earliest work used was in (Bisbey and Hollingworth, 1978). Also, the previous analysis
of the classification models had showed that the patterns produced can be: a) author-oriented
or b) guided-oriented.
Author-oriented pattern is pattern that resulted from the authors or researchers own
definition. It could be based on their characteristics defined for a vulnerability type. The
characteristics, when combined and conditioned, is used as the classifiers. The advantage of
this approach is the author could specifies what are their aim to view. The drawback of this
approach is it is difficult to validate and verify either the accuracy or the correctness of them.
Guided-oriented pattern is pattern that resulted from the authors reference to another
researcher's works. An example as in (Jiwnani and Zelkowitz, 2002). The resulted pattern
exist from characteristics already defined in (Carl et al., 1994). The previous work's charac-
teristics act as the classifiers. The aim of this approach is most likely to prove and enhance
the existing approach which work was frequently cited. The advantage of this approach is
the classifiers have been empirically supported by the earlier work and some results already
exist either fully or partially. However, the drawback of this approach is the limited freedom
to consider his own classifiers opinions except for enhancing purposes.
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Earlier works of RISOS and PA projects, were focusing on operating system domain
- which consist of seven classes of vulnerabilities - incomplete parameter validation, incon-
sistent parameter validation, implicit sharing of confidential data, asynchronous validation,
inadequate identification, violable prohibition and logic error. As digital area emerged, these
days, vulnerability classes are vast and has matured to suit all elements. Thus, the vulnera-
bility common nature and occurrence had been examined and classified into certain views.
However, during the analysis, it is establish that works by the pioneer researchers such as not
only Carl Landwerhl but also Taimur Aslam, Ivan Krsul and Eugene Spafford (Pestacore,
2003) were still referred as the basis guideline by security company, even though their works
were more on UNIX operating system domain . Later, Du and Marthur in 2000, give a new
perspective of categorization by introducing three classifiers that are cause, impact and by-
fix, which are seen to be more generic for non-OS errors. Jiwnani works in 2004 were more
on parts of system that have more vulnerabilities and the Fortify taxonomy in 2006 focus on
common coding errors.
In 2007 and 2008, works by Bazaz and Arthur and Igure, focus on attacks of vulnera-
bility. In 2011, Tripathi refined Du and Marthur works and added the fourth classifiers, aimed
for all type of vulnerabilities but focus on operating system. Later works in 2014 by Joshi
and Singh called ADMIT introduce a fifth classifiers, aimed for nature of attacks. These
findings showed that the authors had expecting different kind of patterns resulted when those
classifiers were applied. The issues, concluded from (Nadeem et al., 2015),(Last, 2015) are
the patterns tend to:
• Too domain specific
• Too complex
• Difficult to validate
Some of them had narrowed down to specific domain like operating system only, which is not
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likely can be applied to others. Of course, the layered or hierarchical type of classification
leads to complexity when a layer can have sub layers. And therefore the ability to validate
their outcome is difficult. To overcome this, the new kind of vulnerability pattern are referred,
which should satisfy the three issues mentioned.
• OWASP
• STRIDE
OWASP is the Open Web Application Security Project which can be found at https://www.
owasp.org. Established in 2004 in USA by non-profit company. It provide unbiased and
practical information about application security. A category of available information is the
vulnerability tagging. This site allows the public to view and search for a vulnerability.
The public also can add their own report of vulnerability using the templates provided. The
problem with this pattern:
• complex category
• confirmation of pattern is questionable
OWASP has a huge category as they layered to its sub categories which was arranged alpha-
betically - currently 20 main pages and 62 pages of subs in its page. Nevertheless, it has the
Top 10 for a dedicated year, but this will create another issue that some pattern may be left
out. Another issue is that the new vulnerability can be reported by anybody, however the
verification of the incident is unclear.
STRIDE is a classification scheme for known threats. It consists six classes (vul-
nerability patterns) and can be used to prioritize threats. The STRIDE scheme consists of
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege. These clas-
sification is concise with simplicity yet, the content for each patterns can still expanding.
Therefore, all patterns are always considered. The simplicity of these patterns are legitimate
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